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PATENT QUALITY AND A TWO-TIERED
PATENT SYSTEM*
VIDYA ATAL†
TALIA BAR‡
In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume
of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent
quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a
proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. In the two-tiered
system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more
costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, ‘gold-plate’ patent. Introducing a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the
incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The
gold-plate tier attracts inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic
value.

I.

INTRODUCTION

THE QUALITY OF PATENTS HAS BEEN A SUBJECT of growing concern. Bad
patents—patents that would have failed the novelty or non-obviousness
patentability requirements had their examiners been more informed—
likely have adverse effects on our society. Patents, good or bad, have social
costs. Patent holders can exclude others from the use of inventions thus
hindering future innovations and commercialization of products, or inducing unnecessary costs of duplication and inventions around existing
patents.
Our paper highlights another, largely overlooked, cost of bad patents—
the negative externality imposed by bad patents on all patent holders. We
argue that bad patents undermine the goals of the patent system because
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they reduce the value of holding patents. Third parties (e.g., competitors,
investors, etc.) are likely less informed than the inventor herself about the
probability of validity of a specific issued patent, but they have an overall
perception of patent quality. How third parties perceive the quality of
patents may affect a patentee’s ability to deter entry, negotiate licensing
fees, bargain, or secure venture capital funding. For example, if patent
quality is perceived to be low, a potential entrant might be less worried
about infringement and an investor might be less impressed by the fact that
a start-up company holds a patent. Patent examination only provides an
imperfect public signal of validity. If a patent system allows many bad
patents, the perceived quality of patents is low and, therefore, so is the
value of holding patents. This limits the ability of the patent system to
reward true inventors.
We study the determinants of patent quality—the probability that a
patented innovation is good (novel and non-obvious in light of the prior
art). The true validity of an innovation is unknown, but every inventor has
private information on the ex-ante (before examination) probability of
validity of her own invention. In equilibrium, there is a threshold probability of validity above which inventors apply for a patent. This threshold and
the perceived patent quality are jointly determined in equilibrium. An
increase in patent quality lowers the threshold, but a lower threshold results
in a lower patent quality.
Concerns over patent quality and the backlog problem1 prompted
several proposals for patent system reforms, for example, a patent opposition system (Merges [1999]), patent bounties (Thomas [2001]), community
patent review (Noveck [2006]) and ‘gold-plate’ patents (Lemley, Lichtman
& Sampat [2005]; Lemley & Lichtman [2007]). Our paper provides insights
on the potential effects of such policies on the volume of patent applications and on the quality of patents. We show that an increase in the
patenting fee reduces the number of patent applications that have low
ex-ante probability of validity; it also increases the quality of patents (that
is, the probability that granted patents are good) and thus, their value.
Making the examination process more stringent has a positive effect on
patent quality, but interestingly, it has an ambiguous effect on the volume
of patent applications. On one hand, stringent examination reduces the
probability of any applicant’s receiving a patent, which deters low probability of validity applicants. On the other hand, the increase in expected
patent quality makes holding a patent more valuable.
We are particularly interested in evaluating the proposal to establish a
two-tiered patent system. In the new system, applicants would be allowed
1
According to recent USPTO data, the unexamined patent applications backlog (i.e.,
patents which are awaiting First Office Action at any given time) is over 600,000 applications.
See http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last accessed May 4, 2013).
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to ‘gold-plate’ their patents by paying a higher fee and being subject to a
more thorough review process. According to Lemley et al. [2005], this
‘would dramatically improve the quality of economically significant
patents.’ The proposal has also attracted the attention of the current
administration:
[W]ith better informational resources, the Patent and Trademark Office
could offer patent applicants, who know they have significant inventions,
the option of a rigorous and public peer-review that would produce a
‘gold-plate’ patent much less vulnerable to court challenge. Where
dubious patents are being asserted, the PTO could conduct low-cost,
timely administrative proceedings to determine patent validity.2
Our paper formally models a two-tiered patent system and examines its
outcomes compared to the standard (single-tiered) system.3 We show that
in equilibrium in a two-tiered system, innovators with high ex-ante probability of validity apply for gold-plate patents, intermediate applicants
apply for regular patents (the lower tier) and the innovators with lowest
probability of validity do not apply. If economically more significant
patents tend to have higher probability of validity than the less significant
ones (for example, due to more intensive prior art search), then their
innovators will be more likely to apply for gold-plate patents. However,
since the choice of patent tier can also depend on the benefits from patenting, sorting based on economic significance (which is one of the intended
consequences of the two-tiered system) is not guaranteed.
We consider a family of two-tiered systems in which the lower tier has the
same examination intensity and fees as the single-tiered system, and the
higher tier offers equally or more intense examination for a higher fee. We
call this an ‘added-tier system.’ We show that introducing an added tier will
reduce the volume of patent applications and of bad patents. Intuitively,
the gold-plate tier attracts the highest probability of validity applicants,
making the quality of regular patents lower than in the single-tiered system.
Thus, the equilibrium in this added-tier system excludes the worst applicants who apply under the single-tiered system. Gold-plate patents are of
better quality than in the single-tiered system (because of better selection of
applicants and more thorough examination). In the added-tier system,
there are fewer bad patents.
We extend the model to consider the incentive to invest in R&D. The set
of innovators then becomes endogenous, and depends on the incentives
2
See Barack Obama on Technology and Innovation at http://obama.3cdn.net/
780e0e91ccb6cdbf6e_6udymvin7.pdf
3
Our model abstracts from some aspects of the original proposal. In particular, Lemley
et al.’s [2005, 2007] proposal involves differences in the presumption of validity of patents in
the two tiers.
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that the patent system provides. We define a simple welfare function that
accounts for the surplus of innovators and consumers. We find that an
added-tier system does not always offer a welfare improvement over the
single-tiered system. Intuitively, reducing the volume of bad patents might
come at the cost of decreased incentive to innovate.
Welfare under an optimal two-tiered system is at least as high as
the welfare under an optimal single-tiered system. We show that when the
benefit from having the highest patent quality is sufficiently large, the
optimal two-tiered system results in strictly higher welfare than the optimal
single-tiered system. This is true because the two-tiered system identifies a
subset of high quality patents; when these offer sufficiently high benefits,
the two-tiered system can increase welfare, as it allows benefiting from the
high quality of gold-plate patents without increasing examination costs.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we discuss the
related literature. In Section III, we describe the model. In Section IV, we
focus on the analysis of the standard single-tiered patent system. In Section
V, we analyze the two-tiered patent system. Section VI considers welfare
and incentives to invest in R&D. Section VII offers a discussion on economic significance of innovations and the incentive to gold-plate patents.
Section VIII concludes.
II.

RELATED LITERATURE

This paper relates to a large body of literature on innovation and patent
policy (see Scotchmer [2006], for a detailed review). Specifically, our paper
contributes to a body of literature that recognizes imperfections in the
functioning of the patent examination process. Farrell and Shapiro [2008]
propose a model of licensing in the shadow of patent litigation. They define
a patent’s strength as the probability that it would be found valid and
infringed if tested in court, and identify conditions under which weak
patents impose a greater social cost. Langinier and Marcoul [2012] concentrate on incentives to search and disclose prior art given an imperfect
examination process. Caillaud and Duchêne [2011] examine the impact of
the patent office on firms’ incentives to innovate and to apply for patents,
and the overload problem patent examiners face. They consider the role of
the patent fees as a policy instrument.
From a theoretical perspective, there is no consensus on the optimal level
of the patent application fees. De Rassenfosse and Van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie [2013] review the economic literature on the role of the patent
fees. They present stylized facts on the patent fees of thirty patent offices
worldwide, illustrating high heterogeneity in the level and structure of
the patent fees. According to their paper, ‘[p]atent fees are generally
applicant friendly and their setting appears to be governed by the imperative to balance budget or to adjust to the level of other patent offices . . .’
© 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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and only recently policy-makers have ‘. . . realized that the patent fees can
be used as a policy tool.’ Based on a survey of R&D labs in the U.S.
manufacturing sector, Cohen et al. [2000] report that 36.7 per cent of
respondents indicated application costs as a reason that figured into their
decision not to patent.
In our paper, patent tiers differ in the fees and examination intensities.
Patent systems may offer tiers that differ along other dimensions. A patent
renewal system can be understood as a multi-tier patent system in which
innovators can choose to pay more for a longer patent life.4 Crampes and
Langinier [1998] suggest that renewals convey information, therefore an
incumbent may prefer not to pay the renewal fee for the patent to signal low
market profitability. Cornelli and Schankerman [1999] show that when
firms have different R&D productivities, patent renewal systems can
improve welfare. Scotchmer [1999] suggests a model with asymmetric
information on the costs and benefits of research. She shows that
all implementable decision rules can be implemented with renewal
mechanisms.
Versions of tiered systems are already in place or being considered in
some countries. Christie and Moritz [2005] describe Australia’s two-tiered
system. Patents in the lower tier (‘innovation patents’) accomodate a lower
threshold of inventiveness and are not subject to opposition prior to grant.
Innovation patents are granted a maximum eight year term and permit up
to five claims.
In Japan, applications are not examined unless there is a request for
examination (for a fee) within three years of application. If a request for
examination has not been made within the time limit, the application is
deemed withdrawn.5 Yamauchi and Nagaoka [2008] study patent system
reform in Japan. Patent offices in other countries including Canada, China,
Germany, India, Korea, Romania, Russia and Thailand also offer deferred
examination or offered some form of delayed examination request (see
Norman et al., [2010]).6 One can view applications for which innovators did
not request examination as belonging to a lower tier.7
Our paper also draws on literature that deals with testing and certification in the presence of asymmetric information. Our model has a certifier
(i.e., the patent office), who can detect low quality (a non-patentable
4
We focused on the application fees. Renewal fees are paid conditional on the patent’s
being granted, and can be captured in our model by the benefit functions.
5
Article 48(3) of the Japanese Patent Law. See Japan Patent Attorneys Association [2012]
available at http://www.jpaa.or.jp/english/aboutus/pdf/open_seminar.pdf
6
Examination delays occur also in systems that do not offer deferred examination. In a
model of the U.S. patent system, Régibeau and Rockett [2010] explain the relationship
between the importance of inventions and delays in examination.
7
In the deferred system, applicants can switch from the lower tier (that offers no examination) to the higher tier by requesting examination. They cannot stay in the lower tier for too
long.
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innovation) with some probability (determined by the examination intensity). According to Dranove and Jin [2010] who review the literature on
quality disclosure and certification, ‘[m]ost of the theoretical work focuses
on the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose quality and for certifiers
to provide unbiased certification about product quality.’ The role of the
patent office is not only to reveal information, but to grant legal intellectual
property rights. This affects the incentives of innovators to apply for
patents and determines the nature of disclosure of information by the
patent office. In some models in the certification literature (e.g., Lizzeri
[1999]), the certifier perfectly observes quality. In other models (e.g., Gill &
Sgroi [2008]), the certifier only observes a signal of quality. In our model,
the test (examination) can identify ‘bad’ applications, but unless the examination is perfect, some bad applications remain undetected.
The study by Farhi, Lerner and Tirole [2013] is relevant to ours in its
examination of tiered certification. In their paper, sellers (analogous to
innovators in our model) want to be rated highly. Sellers start uninformed,
but can quickly learn about the quality of their product. Farhi et al.’s [2013]
paper investigates the questions of transparency (e.g., should failure to be
certified be revealed?) and the coarseness of rating. One important difference in their analysis is that a seller who failed to be certified in the higher
tier can go down the pecking order to be certified by a lower tier (e.g.,
journal submissions). In contrast, in the context of patents, if invalidating
prior art was revealed in the gold-plate patent examination process, the
applicant cannot apply for the lower patent tier.
III.

THE MODEL

There exists a large heterogeneous population of inventors. Each inventor
has one invention, which can be good or bad, but its true state is unknown.
The inventor has private information—an ex-ante (before filing for a
patent) probability that the invention is good, θ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, θ is the
probability that there does not exist any invalidating prior art.8 Inventor
types θ are independently drawn, the cumulative distribution function F(θ)
is differentiable, with a positive density f(θ) > 0
An inventor can choose whether to apply for a patent. The patent application fee is P. Each application is examined in the patent office. For
simplicity, we assume that patentability only depends on whether invalidating prior art is found in the examination process or not. The examiner
searches for prior art exerting search effort such that, if there exists invalidating prior art, it would be found with a probability π. If no invalidating
8
Patent applications often include several claims. Validity is determined claim by claim.
We simplify here by assuming that the patent is either valid—all its claims are valid—or it is
not.
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prior art is found, a patent is granted.9 Hence, a bad innovation is granted
a patent with probability (1 − π) and a good innovation is always granted
a patent.
By making the assumption that invalidating prior art is found with a
known probability π, we implicitly assume that the patent office is committed to (on average) a certain examination intensity. We find this assumption
to be reasonable because the patent office is a government agency that
interacts with inventors repeatedly (creating a reputation); the information
on its budget, the number of employees and the time allocated to patent
examination (at least, on average) can be made public. According to
Cockburn et al. [2003], the ‘USPTO operates various internal systems to
ensure “quality control” through auditing, reviewing and checking examiner’s work.’ Thus, it seems reasonable that, by and large, the patent office
can make sure its employees follow the guidance provided to them concerning examination procedure and intensity.10
We assume that the value of a patent to an inventor depends on the
quality it is perceived to have by less informed third parties. In equilibrium,
perceived quality is correct—it is the probability that a patented innovation
is good (i.e., there does not exist any invalidating prior art):

q = Pr [good patent | patent was granted ].
The benefit from holding a patent depends on whether it is good or bad,
and on the perceived quality of patents. Let G(q) denote the benefit from a
good patent and B(q) denote the benefit from a bad patent.11 An inventor
does not know for sure if her invention is good and if it will be granted a
patent. Her expected payoff from a patent application is:
(1)

V (θ , q ) = θG (q ) + (1 − θ ) (1 − π ) B (q ) − P.

The functions G(q) and B(q) are differentiable and satisfy the following
assumptions:
(2)

G (q ) ≥ B (q ) ≥ 0 and B ′ (q ) , G ′ (q ) > 0 for all q.

We assume that the benefit from a bad patent is lower because, if a
dispute arises, it is less likely to be upheld in court. Benefits increase with
9
This simplifying assumption allows us to focus on the granting of bad (not truly novel)
patents. In reality, the patent office may reject novel innovations, for example, due to
misunderstanding of prior art that was found, or for reasons unrelated to the prior art.
10
For models that account for examiners’ incentives, see Langinier and Marcoul [2010] and
Schuett [2013].
11
We think of these benefits as capturing the value of holding a patent, this can include not
only the value from market power in the market for a patented product, but also other
benefits that a patent holder might enjoy, such as improved bargaining position, reputation,
facilitation in cross-licensing agreements, etc.
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perceived patent quality for several reasons: a higher perceived patent
quality makes infringement less likely, and puts the patentee in a better
position in negotiations over licensing or infringement disputes; a higher
perceived quality also makes the patent more valuable as a signal to investors and rival firms. Finally, for simplicity, the value to inventor from an
invention that is not protected by a patent is assumed to be zero.12

IV.

THE SINGLE-TIERED PATENT SYSTEM

In this section, we examine the single-tiered patent system—the standard
patent system in which inventors face the decision to apply for patent
protection or not to apply, but have no choice regarding the intensity of the
examination process.
IV(i). Equilibrium

The inventor applies for a patent if her expected benefit from applying
exceeds that from not applying, V(θ, q) ≥ 0. Using (1), we find that for any
quality q, there exists a cut-off probability θ1(q), defined by:

(3)

1
if
⎧
⎪
⎪ P − (1 − π ) B (q )
if
θ1 (q ) = ⎨
⎪G (q ) − (1 − π ) B (q )
⎪⎩
0
if

P > G (q )
G (q ) ≥ P ≥ (1 − π ) B (q )
P < (1 − π ) B (q ) ,

so that inventors with ex-ante probability of validity θ ≥ θ1 apply for the
patent and those with θ < θ1 do not apply. If P > G(q), then patents are too
costly and no one applies for a patent. If P < (1 − π)B(q), then the patenting
fee is lower than the expected benefit of applying even if the patent is bad,
so everyone applies for a patent. In the interior range, the threshold θ1(q)
decreases with q. That is, the higher the perceived patent quality, the more
inventors apply for patents.
Taking into account a threshold ex-ante probability of validity θ1 < 1,
above which inventors apply for a patent, the probability that a granted
patent is good is given by:

12
If secrecy allows innovators to benefit from non-patented innovations, the value of not
patenting can be positive and might depend on the innovator’s ex-ante probability of validity.
In this case, the benefit from secrecy would need to be subtracted from the current expression
V(θ, q). Our analysis remains qualitatively the same as long as the resulting net benefit from
patenting is still increasing in θ, which would require the benefit from secrecy not to be too
steep as a function of θ.
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Pr (good and granted )
Pr (granted )

1

(4)

=

∫ θ f (θ ) dθ

θ1

.

1

∫ [1 − π (1 − θ )] f (θ ) dθ

θ1

1

Additionally, q1(1) = 1.13 The lowest value q1 can obtain is ∫ θ f (θ ) dθ , if
0

all inventors apply for a patent (θ1 = 0) and examiners never find invalidating prior art (π = 0); the highest value it can obtain is q1 = 1, when examination is perfect (π = 1). If π < 1, then q1(θ1) is increasing in θ1, because a
higher θ1 indicates an overall better pool of applicants. Equilibrium in the
single-tiered system is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Equilibrium in the single-tiered system is characterized by a
pair (θ1*, q1* ), such that:
(5)

θ1* = θ1 ( q1* ) and

q1* = q1 (θ1* ),

where θ1(.) and q1(.) are defined in (3) and (4). Inventors of type θ ≥ θ1*
apply for a patent and inventors of type θ < θ1* do not apply for a patent.
The equilibrium is interior if θ1* ∈ (0, 1).
It is easy to verify that a unique (not necessarily interior) equilibrium
exists. This holds true because the equilibrium is an intersection between a
decreasing function θ1(q1) and a strictly increasing function q1(θ1).
IV(ii).

Simple Policy Interventions

The equilibrium pair (θ1*, q1* ) depends on the examination intensity π, on
the patenting fee P, and on the benefit functions G(.) and B(.).14 In our first
proposition, we examine how changes in policy-levers affect the volume of
patent applications [1 − F (θ1* )] , and patent quality q1* .
Proposition 1. Assuming an interior equilibrium, (i) an increase in the
patenting fee (P) results in an increase in patent quality and a decrease in
patent applications; (ii) an increase in the examination intensity (π) results
in an increase in patent quality, but has an ambiguous effect on the volume
of patent applications.
By the l’Hospital rule, the limit of (4) as θ1 → 1 is 1.
The benefit functions can be affected by increased patent breadth and longer patent term.
These policies were studied for example by Gilbert and Shapiro [1990], Klemperer [1990],
O’Donoghue [1998], O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse [1998].
13
14

© 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

512

VIDYA ATAL AND TALIA BAR

No Patent

Patent

Figure 1
The effect of an increase in patent fee

Figure 1 illustrates two equilibrium points, E1(π, P1) and E2(π, P2) which
correspond to two systems with the same examination intensity (π) but
different levels of the patent fee (P1 < P2). A higher patent fee results in
fewer patent applications for every q1 (i.e., θ1(q1) shifts right), but no
change in perceived quality q1(θ1) for any θ1. The equilibrium E2 has fewer
patent applications (higher θ1* ) and higher patent quality q1* .15
Figure 2 illustrates two equilibrium points for two different examination
intensities E1(π1, P) and E2(π2, P) with π1 < π2. A higher examination
intensity results in fewer patent applications for a given quality (i.e., θ1(q1)
shifts right), but also results in a higher quality for the given pool of
applicants (q1(θ1) shifts up). The equilibrium E2(π2, P) has a higher patent
quality than E1(π1, P). In the figure, the volume of applications increases,
but this is not always the case. Tougher examination reduces the probability of any applicant to secure a patent, making a patent application less
attractive, particularly to low probability of validity inventors; but the
increase in perceived quality makes patents more valuable. When the
benefit from a patent is sensitive enough to perceived patent quality, then
15
A similar argument implies that a strengthening of patent protection (an increase in G(.)
and B(.)) results in a lower patent quality and more patent applications. In contrast, a
post-grant opposition system (Merges [1999]) or a weakening of the presumption of validity
are likely to lower the benefit functions resulting in an equilibrium with fewer patent applications and a higher patent quality.

© 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

PATENT QUALITY AND A TWO-TIERED PATENT SYSTEM

No Patent

513

Patent

Figure 2
The effect of an increase in examination intensity

the volume of applications could increase with examination intensity. Thus,
a policy reform that would open patent examination to the public (e.g.
Noveck [2006]) is expected to result in an increase in patent quality, but its
effect on the volume of patent applications is ambiguous.
Our analysis throughout the paper assumes that the patent office can
commit to its examination intensity. It is possible that examiners would
intensify their examination if they faced a worse pool of applicants (lower
θ1), as there would be greater need for examination to maintain quality.
Alternatively, examiners might respond to a higher volume of applications
with less intensive examination, due to the increased work-load. Consider
the effects of an increase in the patent fee. We predicted fewer patent
applications and higher patent quality. If examiners intensified their examination, the effect would be to further increase patent quality. However, if
examiners relaxed their examination intensity, this would moderate the
positive effect that the increase in the fees has on patent quality. As long as
the examiners’ response to a higher volume of applications is small, we
expect the predictions of our model to be relevant.
Our model has heterogeneous probabilities of validity, but uniform
benefit functions. In a model with two dimensions of heterogeneity, quality
and value, Koenen [2011] shows that there are conditions under which an
increase in the patent fee may result in a decrease in average patent quality.
In his model too, an increase in the fee increases the threshold for applica© 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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tion, so that fewer invalid ideas are submitted. However, there is an additional effect not present in our analysis. Koenen explains, ‘[a]s the private
value of patents decreases, the quality cutoff level for which patents are
profitable increases, until at the margin only the best patents survive . . .
raising patent fees therefore generically kills off high-quality patent application over-proportionally.’

V.

THE TWO-TIERED PATENT SYSTEM

In their article ‘What to Do about Bad Patents?,’ Lemley et al. [2005]
propose to establish a two-tiered patent system. The proposal was further
discussed in Lemley and Lichtman [2007]. The two-tiered patent system
would give applicants a choice between a low cost patent application which
is not examined thoroughly, and a high cost patent application which
would be subject to a thorough examination and earn a high presumption
of validity. Lemley et al. [2005] suggested that inventors would likely pay
for serious review of their inventions that are economically most important.
Therefore, the two-tiered system will allow the patent office to ‘focus its
examination resources on important patents and pay little attention to the
rest.’ In this section, we extend our basic model to analyze a two-tiered
patent system. We examine inventors’ equilibrium selection of a patent tier
and how it is affected by patent policy.
V(i).

Extending the Model

We maintain most of our assumptions from the previous section, but now
we introduce the two-tiered patent system. Inventors can choose to apply
for a ‘regular’ patent, or for a ‘gold-plate’ patent. Following the proposal of
Lemley et al. [2005], we assume that a gold-plate patent is associated with
a higher fee: Pgp > Pr, and a more thorough examining procedure:
πgp ≥ πr > 0.16 Patent tier (a regular or a gold-plate patent) is public
information.17

16
It is possible to design a system with two tiers such that P1 > P2 and π1 < π2. Depending
on the value of these policy controls, we could have an equilibrium in which low probability
of validity applicants pay more to avoid tough examination, or an equilibrium in which high
probability of validity applicants pay high fees to enjoy being part of a high quality patent
tier. However, our characterization of a thresholds equilibrium and other results use the
assumption that πgp ≥ πr and Pgp ≥ Pr.
17
The patent office can make information on patent tiers available. The policy is not likely
to be effective if this information is not made public. We also note that in the case of the
‘peer-to-patent’ project (see http://peertopatent.org/), it is publicly known who participates in
the special examination process, as these applications are made public to solicit information
from the public.
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The value of a patent to an inventor depends on both its ex-ante probability of validity θ and on the quality of patents of its tier (qr for a regular
patent, or qgp for a gold-plate patent).18 Patent quality depends on the
patent tier for two reasons: the different examination intensities, and the
different endogenously determined selection of patent applicants. An
inventor whose ex-ante probability of validity is θ and who applies for a
patent-tier i ∈ {r, gp}, obtains a value:
(6)

Vi (θ , qi ) = θG (qi ) + (1 − θ ) (1 − π i ) B (qi ) − Pi.

Let us denote the set of inventors who apply for a regular patent by Θr
and the set of inventors who file for a gold-plate patent by Θgp. When the set
of applicants is non-empty, patent quality—the probability that a patent in
tier i ∈ {r, gp} is good—is qi = Pr(good|patent-tier i granted) which is
derived using Bayes’ rule. When the set is empty, we set qi = 0.19 Thus we
define:

(7)

⎧
∫ θ f (θ ) dθ
⎪
Θi
⎪
qi = ⎨ ∫ [1 − π i (1 − θ )] f (θ ) dθ
⎪ Θi
⎪
0
⎩

if

Θi ≠ ∅,

if

Θi = ∅.

We now define the equilibrium in our model. For simplicity (and without
loss of generality), we assume that when indifferent between patenting or
not patenting, inventors choose to patent and when indifferent between a
regular patent and a gold-plate patent, inventors apply for the regular
patent.
Definition 2. A two-tiered patent system equilibrium is given by two
disjoint sets of inventors Θr and Θgp in [0, 1] and patent qualities qr and qgp
such that:
1. θ ∈ Θr, if and only if Vr(θ, qr) ≥ 0 and Vr(θ, qr) ≥ Vgp(θ, qgp);
2. θ ∈ Θgp, if and only if Vgp(θ, qgp) > 0 and Vgp(θ, qgp) > Vr(θ, qr);
3. qr and qgp satisfy equation (7).
The first two conditions imply that inventors choose optimally between
applying for a regular patent, a gold-plate patent or no patent; the third
18
In our model, innovators have the same benefit functions G(.) and B(.) in either tier. In
practice, benefits in the gold-plate tier might be higher. For example, in Australia’s reform,
the lower tier patents are granted for a shorter duration. We conjecture that most of our
findings would remain the same qualitatively.
19
One can define the perceived quality of an empty set of innovators in different ways.
Since we mostly focus on interior equilibria, we do not elaborate on this issue.
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condition states that expectations about patent quality are rational given
all inventors’ choices and the existing patent policy. We will show that in
any equilibrium, the sets Θr and Θgp can be defined using thresholds so that
high types apply for gold-plate patents, and intermediate types apply for a
regular patent.
Definition 3.
(i) A ‘thresholds-equilibrium’ is a two-tiered patent system equilibrium in
which there exist 0 ≤ θ* ≤ θ* ≤ 1 so that in equilibrium inventors with
types θ > θ* apply for a gold-plate patent, inventors with types in the
range (θ*, θ*) apply for a regular patent and inventors with types θ < θ*
do not apply for a patent.
(ii) A thresholds-equilibrium is interior if 0 < θ* < θ* < 1.
In an interior thresholds-equilibrium, at least some inventors apply for
each patent tier, and some do not apply for a patent.20 To guarantee that a
thresholds-equilibrium exists, we assume a ‘single crossing condition’ for
all q:
(8)

G ′ (q ) − (1 − π r ) B ′ (q ) > 0.

This condition states that the cross-derivative of the payoff functions with
respect to the inventor’s type θ and patent quality q is positive. It holds
when B is flatter or only moderately steeper than G.21
In an interior thresholds-equilibrium, the quality of gold-plate patents
is higher than that of regular patents, qgp > qr. Otherwise, for all θ, a
regular patent gives a higher value Vr(θ, qr) ≥ Vgp(θ, qgp) as defined in (6)
and the equilibrium would not be interior. It is easy to verify that any
interior equilibrium is a thresholds-equilibrium. This holds because for
given equilibrium qualities qgp > qr, the difference between the payoff
functions Vgp(.) and Vr(.) is monotone increasing in θ. If a type θ innovator prefers to gold-plate her patent, any higher type would prefer the
same.
An interior thresholds-equilibrium is characterized by threshold levels θ*,
θ* and patent qualities qr and qgp such that H(θ*, θ*, qr, qgp) = 0 where the
function H = (h1, h2, h3, h4), is defined as follows:

20
Non-interior equilibria are also possible. If patent fees are very small (large), it is
possible that all innovators apply (no one applies). A two-tiered system could collapse into
a single-tiered system with all innovators applying either to the regular tier, or to the goldplate tier.
21
Existence of equilibrium (not necessarily interior) can be shown using a fixed point
argument. We omit the proof as the argument is standard, but it is available from the
authors.
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⎫
⎧h1 := θ∗G (qr ) + (1 − θ∗ ) (1 − π r ) B (qr ) − Pr = 0,
⎪h := θ * G q − G (q ) + (1 − θ *) 1 − π B q − (1 − π ) B (q ) ⎪
[ ( gp )
[( gp ) ( gp )
r ]
r
r ]
⎪
⎪ 2
⎪
⎪
− (Pgp − Pr ) = 0,
⎪
⎪
*
θ
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎨h := [θ (1 − q ) − (1 − π ) (1 − θ ) q ] f (θ ) dθ = 0,
3
r
r
r
∫
⎪
⎪
θ∗
⎪
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪h4 := [θ (1 − qgp ) − (1 − π gp ) (1 − θ ) qgp ] f (θ ) dθ = 0.
∫
⎪⎭
⎪⎩
θ*

The first two equations define the thresholds: h1(.) = 0 implies that an
applicant with ex-ante probability of validity θ* is indifferent between
applying for a regular patent and not applying for a patent, Vr(θ*, qr) = 0;
h2(.) = 0 implies that an applicant with ex-ante probability of validity θ* is
indifferent between applying for a regular patent and for a gold-plate
one, Vgp(θ*, qgp) = Vr(θ*, qr). The next two equations define the quality of
regular and gold-plate patents, as obtained from rearranging equation (7).
To derive the effects of the fees and examination intensities on equilibrium, we implicitly differentiate the system of equations H in (9). We
assume that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix (the matrix of partial
derivatives) of this system is positive. We refer to this as the Jacobian
Condition, and write it formally in the Appendix, in Definition 5. In Lemma
1 (Appendix A), we provide a sufficient condition for the Jacobian condition to hold in a special case used in Proposition 6 and in Lemma 2
(Appendix B), a sufficient condition for it to hold for a linear model.22
Consider the effects of changes in the patenting fees.
Proposition 2.
equilibrium,

Under the Jacobian Condition, around an interior

(i) As the gold-plate patent fee (Pgp) increases, the overall volume of
patent applications increases; the volume of gold-plate patent applications decreases; the quality of gold-plate patents and the quality of
regular patents increase; the prevalence of bad patents increases as well;
(ii) As the regular patent fee (Pr) increases, the overall volume of patent
applications decreases.
The effects of the regular patent fee on the other equilibrium variables
and the effects of examination intensities are, in general, indeterminate, but

22
By the implicit function theorem, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, J, appears as
the denominator of each of the comparative statics derivatives. It consists of mostly positive
terms and we found it to be positive in numeric solutions of the model. If J < 0, the effects we
report in the proposition are exactly reversed.
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in Appendix B we state additional results in the special case of a linear
model.

V(ii).

The Added-Tier System

Consider a special family of two-tiered systems in which the regular tier has
the same fee and examination intensity as the single-tiered system. We refer
to such two-tiered system as an ‘added-tier system.’
Definition 4. Given a single-tiered system with examination intensity π
and a patent fee P, an added-tier system is a two-tiered system with
Pgp > Pr = P and πgp ≥ πr = π.
We compare the single-tiered system with an added-tier system.
Proposition 3. Consider a single-tiered system and an added-tier system.
Assume each system has an interior equilibrium. Then in the added-tier
system, (i) there are fewer patent applications than in the single-tiered
system (θ* > θ1); (ii) the quality of regular patents is lower than in the
single-tiered system (qr ≤ q1); (iii) the quality of a gold-plate patents is
higher (qgp ≥ q1); (iv) overall, there are fewer bad patents than in the singletiered system.
Proposition 3 establishes that an added tier results in a decline in the
overall volume of patent applications. The reason for this is that applicants
with the highest probability of validity choose to gold-plate their patents,
leaving an adverse selection of applicants for the regular patent-tier. Hence
regular patents have lower perceived quality than the patents in the singletiered system, and therefore are less attractive. Gold-plate patents have
higher perceived quality than patents in the single-tiered system. Overall,
there are fewer bad patents because there is a decline in low probability of
validity patent applications and a more thorough examination of goldplate patent applications.
An added-tier system involves more intense examination and this potentially increases the patent office’s expenditure. To assure that the expenditure of the patent office does not exceed that in the single-tiered system, the
gold-plate patent fee could be set to cover the additional cost of examination: Pgp ≥ Pr + [c(πgp) − c(πr)]. If the examination intensity of gold-plate
patents is not much higher (πgp − πr is small), then increase in the fee can be
small enough so that some inventors would indeed apply for a gold-plate
patent.
In an added-tier system, innovators with probability of validity θ ≤ θ*
either do not apply for a patent, or apply for a patent that has a lower
quality than a patent in the single-tiered system. Thus, these innovators are
either as well off or worse off. Only innovators who have a high ex-ante
probability of validity θ > θ* might be better off due to the higher quality
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of gold-plate patents. However, since examination intensity is higher and
the fee is higher, it is not guaranteed that they are better off. The effect of
the introduction of an added tier on the payoffs of innovators is negative,
unless the benefit from increased quality of gold-plate patents is sufficiently
large to offset the loss of payoff experienced by applicants who have low
ex-ante probability of validity.

VI.

R&D INVESTMENT AND WELFARE

An important goal of the patent system is to provide incentives to innovate.
We have so far assumed a fixed set of innovators. In this section, we extend
the model to consider the incentives to invest in R&D and social welfare.
Suppose each firm has one idea for innovation. The necessary R&D
investment of each innovation is a random variable I uniformly distributed
over [0, I ]. The probability of validity θ is drawn from a distribution F on
[0, 1]. We assume that the probability of validity θ is revealed to the
innovator after investment but before patenting. Under this assumption,
the probability distribution F before investment is the same as the probability distribution conditional on R&D investment. We therefore keep the
same notation for this distribution. We discuss the known θ case in the
conclusion.
Welfare captures the surplus of innovators, and the additional social
surplus that results from patented and non-patented innovation affecting
consumers and other producers. We denote by SC the social surplus when
a firm invested in R&D, the resulting innovation was good and the innovation was not patented. We denote by SG and SB the added (i.e., not
captured by the patentee) social surplus from a good and a bad patent
respectively. Bad innovations that are not patented have no added social
surplus. We assume, SC ≥ SG ≥ 0 ≥ SB.23
Innovators invest if their expected benefit from investment exceeds the
cost. Because θ is yet unknown at the time the innovator has to decide on
R&D investment, an innovator invests if the R&D cost is lower than her
expected payoff from an innovation. We denote the expected payoff of
innovators by IS (innovators’ surplus). Innovators invest in R&D if
I ≤ IS.24 The innovators’ surplus can be interpreted as a measure for the
incentive to invest in R&D. We define welfare as:

23
For simplicity, we do not explicitly model the source of surplus and abstract from
potential gains from better information about patent quality and from litigation costs.
24
Our innovators’ surplus is similar to the concept of ‘sellers’ welfare’ used by Farhi et al.
[2013] in their analysis of markets for certifications. In the context of a patent race, Grossman
and Shapiro [1987] examined the effects of policy changes on the industry’s expected profits
and stated conditions under which industry profits measure welfare.
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IS

(10) W =

∫
0

(11)

=

net innovators’ surplus

⎫⎪
1 ⎧⎪
CCS
+
R
+
IS
− I ⎬ dI .
⎨



 

I ⎪conditional consumers’ surplus PTO’s net revenue innovators’ surplus ⎪
⎩
⎭

1 ⎛
IS
CCS + R + ⎞ IS .
I ⎝
2 ⎠
conditional social surplus

We define each of the components of this welfare function for the twotiered system. The same definitions apply to the single-tiered system,
where θ* = θ1 and θ* = 1. The conditional consumers’ surplus is defined
by:
θ∗

θ*

0

θ∗

CCS2 = ∫ θ SC f (θ ) dθ +
(12)

∫ [θSG + (1 − θ ) (1 − π r ) SB ] f (θ ) dθ

1

+

∫ [θSG + (1 − θ ) (1 − π gp ) SB ] f (θ ) dθ.

θ*

The first integration term captures surplus from good innovations that
were not patented, and the second and third integration terms capture
surplus from innovations that have received regular patents and gold-plate
patents, respectively.
The net revenue of the patent office captures the patent fees collected
from regular and gold-plate patents, net of the costs of examination. It is
given by:

R2 =

θ*

1

θ∗

θ*

∫ [Pr − c (π r )] f (θ ) dθ + ∫ [Pgp − c (π gp )] f (θ ) dθ.

The innovators’ surplus is defined by:

IS2 =

θ*

∫ [θG (qr ) + (1 − θ ) (1 − π r ) B (qr ) − Pr ] f (θ ) dθ

θ∗

1

+

∫ [θG (qgp ) + (1 − θ ) (1 − π gp ) B (qgp ) − Pgp ] f (θ ) dθ.

θ*

The first line in IS captures the surplus attained by innovators who choose
to apply for the regular tier and the second line captures the surplus from
the gold-plate tier.
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It is easy to see that, for a given patent policy, welfare increases when the
social value of patented or non-patented innovation increases, when the
loss from bad patents decreases (SG, SC or SB increase), and when the cost
of examination c(π) decreases. Given patent policy, the social surplus and
the examination cost do not directly affect the equilibrium in a single-tiered
or a two-tiered system. Therefore, these comparative statics results also
hold for welfare at the optimal patent policy.
VI(i).

Innovators’ Surplus and Welfare in Single-Tiered System

An increase in the patent fee is typically thought to reduce the incentive to
innovate. Our model suggests, however, that in addition to the direct
negative effect of an increase in the patent fees, there is an indirect positive
effect. An increase in the patent fees reduces applications from low probability of validity applicants and results in higher perceived patent quality.
Taking into account that innovators’ benefits increase with patent quality,
there is an indirect positive effect of an increase in the patent fee that at least
partially offsets the negative direct effect. This can be seen by differentiating the single-tiered system innovators’ surplus (IS1) with respect to P. By
the definition of θ1, the indirect effect of P on IS1 through θ1 is zero,
therefore we have:
1

1

d (IS1 )
dq
= − ∫ f (θ ) dθ + ∫ [θG ′ (q1 ) + (1 − θ ) (1 − π ) B ′ (q1 )] f (θ ) dθ 1 .
dP
dP
θ
θ
1 

direct fee effect ≤ 0

1 




quality increase effect ≥ 0

Proposition 4. For uniformly distributed θ, if [G(q) − (1 − π)B(q)] is
concave (or linear) in q, innovators’ surplus decreases with the patent fee.
There exist convex benefit functions for which innovators’ surplus increases
in a range of the patent fees.
By (6), [G(q) − (1 − π)B(q)] represents the slope of the value function V(θ,
q1) with respect to θ. When this expression is concave (or linear) in q, the
indirect effect of an increase in quality on the innovators’ surplus is smaller
in magnitude than the direct (negative) effect, so that innovators’ surplus
declines.25

25
For an increase in examination intensity, we also have a negative direct effect and a
positive indirect effect due to the increase in quality.

d ( IS1 )
dq
= − ∫ (1 − θ ) B (q1 ) f (θ ) dθ + ∫ [θG ′ (q1 ) + (1 − θ ) (1 − π ) B ′ (q1 )] f (θ ) dθ 1 .
dπ
dπ
θ
θ
1

1


direct examination intensity effect ≤ 0

1

1





quality increase effect ≥ 0
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As a self-funded agency, the USPTO relies on the fees to cover its costs.
Should the patent office set a fee that exactly covers, exceeds or subsidizes
its examination costs? This question is particularly relevant in light of the
recent patent reform act that gives the patent office ‘fee setting authority.’26
We show that in the range where P ≤ c(π), the net innovator’s surplus
(NIS = IS + R) increases with the fee. Intuitively, by pricing at the social
cost of examination, the marginal patent applicant generates no value, but
lowers the average quality of all patents, and therefore if the patent office
sets the net innovators’ surplus as its objective function, the fee should be
raised. An increase in the patent fees also increases conditional consumers’
surplus, because fixing the incentive to innovate, unpatented innovations
generate more surplus than patented ones.
Proposition 5. (i) The conditional consumers’ surplus increases with the
patent fees. (ii) In the range where P ≤ c(π), the net innovators’ surplus and
the conditional social surplus also increase with the patent fees.
From (11), we know that welfare equals W1 = CSS ISI1 . The effect of the
increase in the patent fee on welfare is:

dW1
=
dP

dCSS IS1
dP
I



effect on conditional social surplus

+

CSS dIS1
I 
dP


.

effect on incentive to innovate

By Proposition 5, in the range P ≤ c(π), conditional consumers’ surplus
increases with the patent fee. However, an increase in the fee has an
additional, potentially negative effect on the incentive to innovate. Thus,
the welfare maximizing patent fee can, but does not necessarily, exceed the
cost of examination.
VI(ii).

Welfare Improving Two-Tiered System

Since the two-tiered system can be designed to mimic the best single-tiered
system, welfare in an optimal two-tiered system is at least as high as welfare
in the optimal single-tiered system. We show that when G(1) (the benefit
from having a good patent when perceived patent quality is high) is sufficiently large, welfare is strictly higher in the optimal two-tiered system.
Intuitively, a subset of high probability of validity innovators apply for
gold-plate patents, these have a very high perceived quality and thus enjoy
the very high benefits. In the single-tiered system, a very high quality could
only be obtained with either high examination intensity (which would be
costly) or with a high patent fee that would exclude all but the very high
validity applicants (which could reduce the incentive to innovate). With a
26

See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1249eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1249eh.pdf
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two-tiered system on the other hand, the high quality of gold-plate patents
can be enjoyed without excluding a significant volume of low ex-ante
probability of validity applicants, because these applicants can still apply
for the regular (low fee) tier.
To establish more formally that a two-tiered system can result in higher
welfare, we consider an added-tier system that differs from the single-tiered
system only in the gold-plate patent fee: πr = πgp = π and Pr = P, but
Pgp > P. There is a threshold gold-plate patent fee Pgp so that for Pgp ≥ Pgp ,
no innovator applies for a gold-plate patent and the two-tiered system
results in the same equilibrium as the single-tiered system. We consider a
small reduction in Pgp from Pgp so as to obtain an added-tier system, and
examine the effects on welfare from (11). Generally, a decrease in Pgp results
in an increase in the conditional consumers’ surplus, but an indeterminate
effect on the revenues of the patent office and on the innovators’ surplus.
When Pgp is decreasing from Pgp and G(1) is ‘high enough’ compared to the
benefit of a good patent in the single-tiered system G(q1), the revenue of the
patent office increases because the additional fees collected from the goldplate patent applicants exceeds the loss of fees from the applicants with low
probability of validity that do not apply. Thus, when G(1) is large enough,
welfare increases with a small reduction in the gold-plate patent fee below
Pgp , which results in a two-tiered system with higher welfare, even if the
innovators’ surplus decreases. In the proof of Proposition 6, we formalize
the condition on G(1). We note that the condition never holds for linear
benefit functions, but holds for other (convex) functions.27
Proposition 6. Welfare under an optimal two-tiered system is at least as
high as welfare under the optimal single-tiered system. The optimal twotiered system can result in strictly higher welfare than the optimal singletiered system when G(1) is sufficiently high compared to G(q1).
To gain further insight on welfare improving two-tiered systems, we
solved the model numerically. We will now informally describe some
insights we gained.28 Using a uniform distribution of types (θ) and quadratic benefit functions, we found two-tiered systems that increase welfare
above that of an optimal single-tiered system. The improvement in welfare
was higher for higher costs of examination. Intuitively, convex benefit
functions offer particularly high benefits to the applicants with high patent
27
The proof of the proposition uses an added-tier system. We could not rule out the
possibility that there exist other two-tiered systems that improve welfare even in a linear
model, but numeric solutions we pursued did not yield welfare improvements while using
linear benefit functions.
28
We used the publicly available software R available at http://www.R-project.org to
compute numeric solutions. Programs and more detailed results are available upon request
from the authors.

© 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

524

VIDYA ATAL AND TALIA BAR

qualities. If the cost of intense examination is low, high quality patents can
be achieved with high examination intensity even in a single-tiered system.
But when examination is more costly, the two-tiered system allows identifying a subset of high quality patents while keeping examination intensities
relatively low.
In the numeric examples we solved, optimal two-tiered systems featured
differential application fees Pgp > P > Pr, but examination intensities that
were equal or close across the two tiers, and were lower than in the singletiered system. The assumption that πgp ≥ πr (which was part of the policy
reform proposed by Lemley et al. [2005]) might be too restrictive. It is
possible that welfare could be even higher with lower examination intensity
in the gold-plate tier. The intuition why πgp should not be too high is that
patents with higher ex-ante probability of validity sort into the gold-plate
patent tier. Therefore, at least ex-post stringent examination of gold-plate
patents is not efficient. We note, however, that our model did not take
liquidity constraints into account. If many applicants with high probability
of validity cannot afford the high gold-plate patent fees, it might be better
to design a system with high examination intensity for gold-plate patent
applications instead of high fees so as not to exclude budget constrained
high probability of validity applicants from the gold-plate tier.
VII.

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE AND GOLD-PLATE PATENTS

Lemley et al. [2005] suggested that ‘most likely applicants would pay for
serious review with respect to their most important patents but conserve
resources on their most speculative entries.’ We examine this statement in
the context of our model.
Atal and Bar [2010] found that innovators with high R&D costs have a
stronger incentive to search for prior art before investing in R&D, so as to
save the cost if their invention is not novel. High cost R&D projects are also
likely to be the ones with high economic value (to cover the R&D cost). We
therefore expect that these innovators will have a higher probability of
validity. Innovators who plan to commercialize their patented products are
also likely to have more incentive to search for prior art because, before
commercialization, they would need to ensure that they do not infringe on
existing patents. Thus, it is plausible that economically significant innovations would tend to have higher ex-ante probability of validity, and would
be more likely to gold-plate patents, supporting the view of Lemley et al.
[2005].
Economic significance is likely manifested in higher benefit functions. So
far we assumed that all innovators have the same benefit functions. Below
we provide a rationale for why differences in benefit functions imply an
ambiguity with respect to how economic significance affects the incentives
to gold-plate patents. We assume (1) innovators have heterogeneous (pri© 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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vately observed) benefit functions; and (2) there is an equilibrium with
patent qualities qgp > qr. An innovator prefers the gold-plate patent if:
(13)

θ [G (qgp ) − G (qr )] + (1 − θ )[(1 − π gp ) B (qgp ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )]
− (Pgp − Pr ) > 0.

Differences in the benefit functions G and B affect the left hand side of
(13) and hence the incentives to gold-plate. If for the economically significant patent, the function G is higher and steeper everywhere, then
[G(qgp) − G(qr)] would be higher for the economically significant patent,
which suggests a larger incentive to gold-plate. If, however, both benefit
functions are higher by a constant and πgp > πr, then [G(qgp) − G(qr)] is the
same, but [(1 − πgp)B(qgp) − (1 − πr)B(qr)] is lower for the economically more
significant innovation as more is gained from a bad patent with larger
benefits in the regular patent tier. As a result, the innovator with an economically significant patent would more likely apply for a regular patent,
creating an opposite effect from that suggested by Lemley et al. [2005].29
Economically more significant innovations are likely different from the
less valuable ones in the shape and level of both benefit functions, as well as
in the ex-ante probability of validity. The combined effect results in an
ambiguity over the question of whether applicants of economically significant innovations are, in fact, more likely to gold-plate their patents.
VIII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Patent system reform has been a subject of intense policy debate in recent
years with the quality of patents a central issue. This paper sheds light on
the determinants of patent quality and of the volume of patent applications. Our analysis highlights an important aspect of the social costs of bad
patents—they impose a negative externality on good patent holders
(because they decrease average patent quality) and, therefore, decrease the
value of patents to all inventors.
We considered a proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system, and
found that, while adding a gold-plate tier to an existing regular-tier
decreases the volume of applications and the probability that bad patents
will be issued, it does not always increase welfare. A two-tiered system can
identify a subset of high quality patents—those in the gold-plate tier.
Welfare gains from a two-tiered system arise when innovators’ benefits
from high quality patents are large compared to the benefits from lower
quality patents. By sorting high validity applicants into the gold-plate tier,
these high benefits can be enjoyed without the need to exclude all lower
29
Additionally, private and social economic significance might not be the same. See Chang
[1995].
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validity innovators from the patent system, or to expend extraordinary
resources on examination. The optimal two-tiered system does not necessarily have overall fewer bad patents, but their instances would be lower in
the gold-plate tier than in the regular tier.
Equilibrium selection sorts high probability of validity applicants into
the gold-plate patent tier. If examination intensity in the gold-plate tier is
more intense, this effort is aimed precisely at those applications that are
least likely to be invalid, which seems inefficient. Indeed, numeric solutions
of the model show that in an optimal two-tiered system, the examination
intensity in the gold-plate tier is not necessarily more stringent, but the
higher fee for gold-plate patents creates selection of high probability of
validity applicants into the gold-plate tier. We also note that to implement
a system with higher examination intensity for the gold-plate tier, it is
important for the patent office to have strong mechanisms for monitoring
examiners’ efforts; otherwise, there may be an incentive ex-post to reduce
examination intensity in the gold-plate tier.30
Equilibrium selection into the two tiers reveals information about the
ex-ante probability of validity of innovations.31 According to Lemley et al.
[2005], a two-tiered system would sort economically significant patents. To
the extent that economically significant innovations tend to have higher
ex-ante probability of validity, our model agrees with this pattern of selection. However, it is likely that economically more significant patents have
different benefit functions, in which case the gold-plate tier does not necessarily attract economically significant innovations.
Patent law states that ‘a patent shall be presumed valid’ and that the
‘burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest
on the party asserting such invalidity’ (35 USC 282). Lemley and Lichtman
[2007] suggest that gold-plate patent holders should enjoy a presumption of
validity but patents in the lower tier should not. However, they explain that
‘it is far from a simple matter to predict how changes in a legal presumption
would change actual case outcomes.’ Our model abstracts from the issue of
presumption of validity.
We do not account for liquidity constraints that may prevent some
inventors from gold-plating patents even if their ex-ante probability of
validity is high. A two-tiered system might disadvantage small, financially
constrained inventors who would be pooled with lower quality applicants
30
A way to facilitate the commitment to a higher examination intensity could be to
establish a different examination procedure for gold-plate patent applications. For example,
to open the examination of gold-plate patents but not that of the regular patents to the public
peer review, as in the ‘peer-to-patent’ project (see http://peertopatent.org/); or to assign a
second reviewer to gold-plate patents but not to regular patents.
31
A system with more than two tiers, perhaps even a continuum of patent tiers, might
extract more information from the applicants. However, implementing a multi-tiered system
might be more challenging in practice. Gill and Sgroi [2008] present a model with a continuum
of tests.
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in the lower tier. A fee schedule that allows discounts for small entities, as
in the current system, can alleviate this concern.32
Our welfare analysis accounts for incentives to innovate. However, we
assume, for simplicity, that the innovator learns her probability of validity
only after R&D investment. This simplifies the analysis because it implies
that the distribution of ex-ante probability of validity is the same before
and after R&D investment. If, however, innovators have full or partial
information on their probability of validity before investing in R&D, then
high probability of validity innovators would have a stronger incentive to
invest, and hence higher threshold of R&D cost. As a result, the probability
distribution of types in the known θ case is endogenous—there is a better
selection of types conditional on R&D investment. For example, an innovator whose probability of validity is lower than the patenting threshold
will never invest in R&D when θ is known. A two-tiered system might
provide a higher incentive to invest in R&D for high probability of validity
applicants. It might also have an effect on the nature of R&D spending. For
example, incremental innovations (i.e., small improvements compared to
the existing prior art) have a lower ex-ante probability of validity, and so,
these innovators will have a reduced incentive to invest in R&D, whereas
innovators with a bigger inventive step will have an increased incentive to
invest in R&D. Additionally, a two-tiered system might increase the incentive to search for prior art if it benefits inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity. A formal analysis of these effects is left for future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS

Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the range of interior
(1 − π)B(q1(0)) ≤ P ≤ G(1). The equilibrium is defined by the system:

(14)

equilibria

⎧ l1 (.) := θ1G (q1 ) + (1 − θ1 ) (1 − π ) B (q1 ) − P = 0, ⎫
⎪
⎪
1
⎨
⎬
l
.
:
θ
1
q
1
π
1
θ
θ
θ
=
−
−
−
−
q
f
d
=
0.
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
[
]
1
1
∫
⎪2
⎪
θ1
⎩
⎭

The function l1(.) increases with θ1 and q1:

∂l1
= G (q1 ) − (1 − π ) B (q1 ) ≥ 0,
∂θ1
∂l1
= θ1G ′ (q1 ) + (1 − θ1 ) (1 − π ) B ′ (q1 ) > 0.
∂q1
32
We note, however, that it might sometimes be hard for the patent office to verify whether
a company that claims to be a small entity is really small, which might make it hard to
implement a policy with sliding scale fees that are based on size.
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The inequalities follow from the assumption (2). Similarly, l2(.) increases with θ1
and decreases with q1:

∂l 2
= − [θ1 (1 − q1 ) − (1 − π ) (1 − θ1 ) q1 ] f (θ1 ) > 0,
∂θ1
1

∂l 2
= − ∫ [1 − π (1 − θ )] f (θ ) dθ < 0.
∂q1
θ
1

We derive comparative statics around an interior equilibrium, θ1(π, P) and q1(π, P)
that solve (14). For any policy control variable η ∈{π, P}, we have:

∂l1 ∂l1 dθ1 ∂l1 dq1
= 0,
+
+
∂η ∂θ1 dη ∂q1 dη
∂l2 ∂l2 dθ1 ∂l2 dq1
+
+
= 0.
∂η ∂θ1 dη ∂q1 dη
Solving, we find:

(

∂l1

dθ1
∂q1
=
dη ⎡ ∂∂θl1 −
⎣ 1

)

∂ l2 ∂ l2
−
∂q1 ∂η
∂l1 ∂l2
∂q1 ∂q1

(

)

∂l1
∂η
∂ l2 ⎤
∂θ1 ⎦

and

(

∂l1

dq1
∂q1
=
dη ⎡ ∂∂θl1 −
⎣ 1

)

∂l2 ∂l1
−
∂q1 ∂η
∂l1 ∂l2
∂q1 ∂q1

(

)

∂ l2
∂η
.
∂ l2 ⎤
∂θ1 ⎦

We first determine the sign of the denominator. We have shown that in
an interior equilibrium, ∂∂θl11 ≥ 0, ∂∂θl21 > 0, ∂∂ql11 > 0 and ∂∂ql21 < 0 . These results imply that

⎡ ∂∂θl1 −
⎣ 1

(

∂l1
∂q1

)

∂ l2 ∂ l2 ⎤
∂q1 ∂θ1 ⎦

> 0. Hence,

⎡ ⎛ ∂l
⎛ dθ ⎞
sign ⎜ 1 ⎟ = sign ⎢⎜ 1
⎝ dη ⎠
⎣⎝ ∂q1

∂l2 ⎞ ∂l2 ∂l1 ⎤
,
−
∂q1 ⎟⎠ ∂η ∂η ⎥⎦

⎡ ⎛ ∂l
⎛ dq ⎞
sign ⎜ 1 ⎟ = sign ⎢⎜ 1
⎝ dη ⎠
⎣⎝ ∂q1

∂l2 ⎞ ∂l1 ∂l2 ⎤
.
−
∂q1 ⎟⎠ ∂η ∂η ⎥⎦

Differentiating the functions l1 and l2 with respect to the patenting fee P and the
dq
dq
θ1
examination intensity π, we find that ddP
> 0, dP1 > 0 and dπ1 > 0 .
dθ
The sign of dπ1 is ambiguous. For example, consider benefit functions G(q) = 3q
and B(q) = q. In a neighborhood of π = 12 , if P = 1, then the increase in π would result
in an increase in θ1. However, if P = 2, then the increase in π would result in a decrease
in θ1.
■
Definition 5 (Jacobian Condition). The Jacobian condition holds if the determinant
of the matrix of partial derivatives of the system (9) is positive.
Differentiating the system, it is found that the Jacobian condition holds iff the
following holds true:
(15)

⎛ ∂h ∂h ∂h ∂h ⎞ ⎛ ∂h ∂h4
∂h ∂h4 ⎞ ∂h1 ∂h2 ∂h3 ∂h4
− 2
> 0.
−
J =⎜ 1 3 − 1 3 ⎟⎜ 2
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
q
q
q
qgp ∂θ * ⎟⎠ ∂θ∗ ∂qr ∂θ * ∂qgp
θ
θ
θ
*
⎝
⎝ ∗ r
r
gp
∗⎠
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⎛
⎞
We divide J by the positive term ⎜ ∂∂θh1 ∂∂θh2* ∂∂qh3r ∂∂qhgp4 ⎟ to obtain an expression J that has
∗
⎝ + + − − ⎠
the same sign as J. Substituting the derivatives of the functions hi for the case of a
uniform distribution function and rearranging, we find that the Jacobian condition
holds if and only if:
⎡θ G ′ (qr ) + (1 − θ∗ ) (1 − π r ) B ′ (qr )⎤⎦ qr (1 − π r qr )
J=⎣ ∗
[G (qr ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )]
(θ * + θ∗ )

(1 − π gpqgp )
[θ *G ′ (qgp ) + (1 − θ *) (1 − π gp ) B ′ (qgp )]qgp
[G (qgp ) − G (qr )] − [(1 − π gp ) B (qgp ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )] (1 + θ *)
(1 − π gpqgp )
[θ *G ′ (qgp ) + (1 − θ *) (1 − π gp ) B ′ (qgp )]qgp
+
[G (qgp ) − G (qr )] − [(1 − π gp ) B (qgp ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )] (1 + θ *)
+

(16)

⎣⎡θ∗G ′ (qr ) + (1 − θ∗ ) (1 − π r ) B ′ (qr )⎤⎦ qr (1 − π r qr )
[G (qr ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )]
(θ * + θ∗ )

⎛
(1 − π r qr ) ⎞
[θ *G ′ (qr ) + (1 − θ *) (1 − π r ) B ′ (qr )] qr
+ 1− ⎜
⎟ > 0.
⎝ [G (qgp ) − G (qr )] − [(1 − π gp ) B (qgp ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )] (θ * + θ∗ ) ⎠
Remark. All terms in this expression are positive, but the last appears with a negative
sign. If the last term is smaller than 1, then J > 0 . We derive sufficient conditions for
J > 0 in Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. We derive comparative statics around an interior equilibrium that solves H(.) = 0 where H is defined in (9). Denote an interior equilibrium by
θ*(Pgp, Pr, πgp, πr), θ*(Pgp, Pr, πgp, πr), qr(Pgp, Pr, πgp, πr) and qgp(Pgp, Pr, πgp, πr). The
proportion of innovators who are granted bad patents in a two-tiered patent system
is given by:
(17)

θ*

1

θ∗

θ*

N 2 = (1 − π r ) ∫ (1 − θ ) f (θ ) dθ + (1 − π gp ) ∫ (1 − θ ) f (θ ) dθ .

First, we note , given our assumptions, it is easy to find that for hi defined in (9), we
have:

∂h1
∂h1
> 0,
> 0,
∂θ∗
∂qr
(18)

∂h2
∂h2
∂h2
> 0,
< 0,
> 0,
∂qgp
∂qr
∂θ *
∂h3 ∂h3
∂h3
=
< 0,
> 0,
∂θ∗ ∂θ *
∂qr
∂h4
∂h4
< 0.
> 0,
∂qgp
∂θ *
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To derive comparative statics, for any policy control variable η ∈ {Pgp, Pr, πgp, πr},
we differentiate the system H with respect to each policy control variable. We have:

∂h1 ∂h1 dθ∗ ∂h1 dqr
= 0,
+
+
∂η ∂θ∗ dη ∂qr dη

∂h2 ∂h2 dθ * ∂h2 dqr ∂h2 dqgp
+
+
= 0,
+
∂η ∂θ * dη ∂qr dη ∂qgp dη

∂h3 ∂h3 dθ∗ ∂h3 dθ * ∂h3 dqr
+
+
+
= 0,
∂η ∂θ∗ dη ∂θ * dη ∂qr dη
∂h4 ∂h4 dθ * ∂h4 dqgp
= 0.
+
+
∂η ∂θ * dη ∂qgp dη
Solving the system, we find

dθ∗
dη

=

dθ *
=
dη

(

∂h1 ∂h3 ∂h2 ∂h4
∂qr ∂θ * ∂qgp ∂η

∂h2 ∂h4
∂qr ∂qgp

⎡
⎣

(

(

⎡
⎣

(

−

∂h4
∂qgp

∂h1 ∂h3
∂θ∗ ∂qr

∂h1 ∂h3
∂ θ∗ ∂ η

∂h1 ∂h3
∂θ∗ ∂qr

− ∂∂hη2
− ∂∂hη1

)+(

− ∂∂qh1r
∂h3
∂ θ∗

∂h1 ∂h3
∂qr ∂θ∗

)(

∂h1 ∂h3
∂qr ∂η

∂h3
∂ θ∗

)+(

)(

∂h2 ∂h4
∂θ * ∂qgp

∂h2 ∂h4
∂qgp ∂η

∂h2 ∂h4
∂θ * ∂qgp

− ∂∂hη1

−

∂h3
∂qr

)( θ

∂h2 ∂h4
∂ * ∂qgp

− ∂∂qhg2p

− ∂∂hη2

∂h2 ∂h4
∂qgp ∂θ *

∂h4
∂qgp

)−

∂h4
∂θ *

)(

)−

− ∂∂qhgp2

∂h4
∂θ *

)+

∂h1 ∂h2 ∂h3 ∂h4
∂η ∂qr ∂θ * ∂qgp

∂h1 ∂h2 ∂h3 ∂h4 ⎤
∂θ∗ ∂qr ∂θ * ∂qgp ⎦

∂h1 ∂h3
∂θ∗ ∂qr

− ∂∂qh1r

∂h3
∂ θ∗

∂h1 ∂h2 ∂h3 ∂h4 ⎤
∂θ∗ ∂qr ∂θ * ∂qgp ⎦

,

).

Under the Jacobian condition, the denominator is positive. Hence, for any policy
control variable η ∈ {Pgp, Pr, πgp, πr}, we have:

⎛ dθ ⎞
sign ⎜ ∗ ⎟
⎝ dη ⎠

⎡
⎤
⎞
⎛
⎢⎛ ∂h1 ∂h3 ⎞ ⎜ ∂h2 ∂h4 − ∂h2 ∂h4 ⎟ − ∂h1 ⎛ ∂h2 ∂h3 ∂h4 ⎞ ⎥
⎢⎜⎝ ∂qr ∂θ * ⎟⎠ ⎜ ∂qgp ∂η ∂η ∂qgp ⎟ ∂η ⎜⎝ ∂qr ∂θ * ∂qgp ⎟⎠ ⎥
⎢
⎥
⎝ +
−
+ ⎠
+
= sign ⎢
⎥,
⎛
⎞
⎢
⎥
∂h ∂h ∂h ∂h ⎛ ∂h ∂h4
∂h ∂h4 ⎞
⎢
⎥
+ ⎜ 1 3 − 1 3⎟⎜ 2
− 2
⎟
⎢
⎥
⎜ ∂qr ∂η ∂η ∂qr ⎟ ⎝ ∂θ * ∂qgp ∂qgp ∂θ * ⎠
⎝ +
+ ⎠
⎣
⎦
+

⎡
⎤
⎛
⎞
⎛ ∂h2 ∂h4 ⎞ ⎜ ∂h1 ∂h3 ∂h1 ∂h3 ⎟
⎢
⎥
−
⎜⎝ ∂q ∂q ⎟⎠ ⎜ ∂θ ∂η ∂η ∂θ ⎟
⎢
⎥
r
gp ⎜
∗⎟
⎢
⎥
⎝ +∗
⎛ dθ * ⎞
−
− ⎠
⎥,
sign ⎜
= sign ⎢
⎟
⎝ dη ⎠
⎢
⎛
⎞⎥
⎢ + ⎛ ∂h1 ∂h3 − ∂h1 ∂h3 ⎞ ⎜ ∂h2 ∂h4 − ∂h2 ∂h4 ⎟ ⎥
⎢ ⎜⎝ ∂θ ∂qr ∂qr ∂θ ⎟⎠ ⎜ ∂qgp ∂η ∂η ∂qgp ⎟ ⎥
∗
∗ ⎝
+
+ ⎠⎥
⎣⎢
⎦
+
⎛
⎞
∂ h dθ
∂h dθ * ⎟
∂h
⎛ dq ⎞
,
sign ⎜ r ⎟ = sign ⎜ − 3 − 3 ∗ − 3
⎜ ∂η ∂θ dη ∂θ * dη ⎟
⎝ dη ⎠
⎜⎝
⎟⎠
∗
−
−
⎛ ∂h
∂h4 dθ * ⎞
⎛ dqgp ⎞
4
−
=
−
sign ⎜
sign
⎜
⎟,
⎝ dη ⎠⎟
⎜⎝ ∂η ∂θ * dη ⎟⎠
−
dθ ⎤
dθ *
⎡
⎛ dN 2 ⎞
sign ⎜
− (1 − π r ) (1 − θ∗ ) f (θ∗ ) ∗ ⎥ .
= sign ⎢(π gp − π r ) (1 − θ *) f (θ *)
⎝ dη ⎟⎠
dη
dη ⎦
⎣
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The signs in the above expressions are obtained using (18).
Proposition 2(i): Everything else being fixed, differentiating h1, h2, h3 and h4 with
respect to Pgp, we get:

∂h2
∂h
∂h
∂h1
= −1.
= 3 = 4 = 0,
∂Pgp
∂Pgp ∂Pgp ∂Pgp
Therefore,

dθ∗
dPgp

dq

dθ *
< 0, dP
> 0, dPgpgp > 0, dPgpr > 0 and
gp
dq

dN 2
dPgp

> 0.

Proposition 2(ii): As we have done above, everything else being fixed, differentiating h1, h2, h3 and h4 with respect to Pr, we get:

∂h3 ∂h4
∂h2
∂h1
= 0.
=
= 1,
= −1,
∂Pr ∂Pr
∂Pr
∂Pr
Therefore,

dθ∗
dPr

> 0.

■

Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose, by contradiction, that θ* ≤ θ1. Then, in the added-tier system, the
quality of regular patents would be lower than the quality of a patent in the
single-tiered system (qr < q1) for two reasons: (a) more low ex-ante probability
∂q
of validity inventors apply (θ* ≤ θ1 and ∂θ r > 0 ), and (b) some high ex-ante
∗
probability of validity inventors apply for a gold-plate patent (θ* < 1 and
∂qr
> 0 ). However, applying for a regular patent becomes less appealing than
∂θ *
applying for a patent in the single-tiered system, which would imply θ* > θ1, a
contradiction. Hence, in the new system, there must be fewer patent applications: θ* > θ1.
(ii) If qr > q1, then θ* ≤ θ1 which, as we saw in (i), yields a contradiction. Thus,
qr ≤ q1.
(iii) Using l2(θ1, q1; π, P) in (14) in the proof of Proposition 1, we can re-write the
equilibrium equation for qgp as:

l2 (θ *, qgp ; π gp, P ) =

1

∫ [θ (1 − qgp ) − (1 − π gp ) (1 − θ ) qgp ] f (θ ) dθ = 0.

θ*

∂ l2
∂θ1

> 0 and ∂∂lπ2 > 0 . By
assumption, πgp ≥ πr = π. By part (i) of this proof, we have θ* > θ* > θ1. Therefore, qgp > q1.
(iv) The proportion of innovators who are granted bad patents in a single-tiered
patent system is given by:
We have already shown (see proof of Propositions 1) that

1

N1 = (1 − π ) ∫ (1 − θ ) f (θ ) dθ
θ1
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and the proportion of innovators who are granted bad patents in this added-tier
system is given in (17) in the proof of Proposition 2. Because θ* > θ* > θ1 and
πgp ≥ πr = π, we have:
θ∗

1

θ1

θ*

N1 − N 2 = (1 − π ) ∫ (1 − θ ) f (θ ) dθ + (π gp − π ) ∫ (1 − θ ) f (θ ) dθ > 0.

■

Proof of Proposition 4. For uniformly distributed θ, we have:

dIS1
dq
(1 + θ1 )
(1 − θ1 )
= − (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − θ1 ) ⎡⎢
G ′ (q1 ) +
(1 − π ) B ′ (q1 )⎥⎤ 1 .
2
dP
⎣ 2
⎦ dP
dq

1
< 0 . We consider the
In a range of corner solutions θ1 = 0, we have dP1 = 0 and dIS
dP
range of interior solutions, with θ1 > 0, which holds for P > 2B−π so that applicants
1
> 0 iff the following holds:
with type θ = 0 find patenting too costly. Hence, dIS
dP

⎡ (1 + θ1 ) G q + (1 − θ1 ) 1 − π B q ⎤ dq1 > 1.
(
) ′ ( 1 )⎥
′ ( 1)
⎢⎣ 2
2
⎦ dP
From (14), we know that:

θ1 =

(1 − π ) q1 − (1 − q1 )
>0
(1 − π q1 )
(1− q )

dq

and hence q1 > (1−π1) . Substituting for dP1 from the proof of Proposition 1 and
1
> 0 iff the following holds:
re-arranging, we therefore get dIS
dP

(1 − q1 ) (1 − π q1 )
[G ′ (q1 ) − (1 − π )B ′ (q1 )] > [G (q1 ) − (1 − π ) B (q1 )].
2 (1 − π )
We know that:

(1 − q1 ) (1 − π q1 )
(1 − π q1 )
≤ q1
≤ q1.
2 (1 − π )
2
If the benefit functions are linear, or, more generally, if [G(q) − (1 − π)B(q)] is concave
in q, then we have:

[G (q ) − (1 − π ) B (q )] ≥ q [G ′ (q ) − (1 − π )B ′ (q )] for all q,
which gives us the following:

[G (q1 ) − (1 − π ) B (q1 )] ≥ q1 [G ′ (q1 ) − (1 − π ) B ′ (q1 )]
(1 − q1 ) (1 − π q1 )
≥
[G ′ (q1 ) − (1 − π ) B ′ (q1 )],
2 (1 − π )
and this implies that

dIS1
dP

< 0.
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Suppose the benefit functions are G(q) = Gqn, B(q) = Bqn, n > 2, and G > B. Then, in
the range of interior solutions,

dIS1
dP

> 0 iff

n(1− q1 )(1−π q1 )
2 q1 (1−π )

> 1 where, by the equilibrium

conditions (14), q1 is the solution of the following:

G − qn
(1 − q1 )
1
=
.
(1 − π q1 ) 2 [G − (1 − π ) B ]
P

(19)

1
> 0 sometimes holds, consider π = 0 and P > 2Bn so
To show that the condition for dIS
dP
n(1− q )
1
> 0 for 2 q1 1 > 1 or q1 < 2+n n .
that we have an interior solution, θ1 > 0. Then dIS
dP
Taking, for example, n = 4, IS1 increases when q1 < 23 which by (19) holds true when
5
P < ( B + 12 G )( 23 ) .
■

Proof of Proposition 5. We first show that in a single-tiered system, the conditional
consumers’ surplus increases with P:

dθ
dCCS1
= [θ1 (SC − SG ) + (1 − θ1 ) (1 − π ) ( −SB )] f (θ1 ) 1 ≥ 0.
dP
dP
The inequality is strict in the range of interior equilibrium.
We next claim that the net innovators’ surplus increases with P when P ≤ c(π). To
show this, we differentiate NIS1 with respect to P and use the definition of θ1 and the
results of Proposition 1:

dθ ∂NIS1 dq1
dNIS1
= − [ P − c (π )] f (θ1 ) 1 +
≥ 0.
dP
dP
∂q1
dP

 

≥0

≥0

By (11), the conditional social surplus in a single-tiered system is given by:

CSS1 = CCS1 + ( P − c (π )) (1 − F (θ1 )) +

IS1
.
2

Consider first a range where IS1 increases with P, if such range exists for the given
functional forms of the model. Then,

dθ 1 dIS1
dCSS1 dCCS1
=
+ (1 − F (θ1 )) − ( P − c (π )) f (θ1 ) 1 +
,
dP 2 dP
dP
dP
1
1
≥ 0 and in this case dIS
≥ 0.
which is positive when P ≤ c(π) because dCCS
dP
dP
Now assume that IS1 is decreasing in P. Rearrange the conditional social surplus so
that:

CSS1 = CCS1 + NIS1 −

IS1
.
2

Then,

dCSS1 dCCS1 dNIS1 1 dIS1
=
+
−
>0
dP
dP
dP
2 dP
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because we know that

dCCS1
dP

≥ 0 ; in the range P ≤ c (π ) , we also know that

and we are considering the case where

dIS1
dP

dNIS1
dP

≥ 0,

< 0.

Therefore, the conditional social surplus is maximized at a fee higher than the cost
of examination: P* > c(π).
■
Proof of Proposition 6. We derive a sufficient condition for a two-tiered system to
strictly increase welfare above that in a given optimal (welfare-maximizing) singletiered system. Let P and π denote the patent fees and examination intensity in an
(interior) optimal single-tiered system. We consider an added-tier system that only
differs from the single-tiered system in the patent fee for gold-plate patents. That is,
Pr = P, πr = πgp = π, and Pgp > P. Let the threshold gold-plate patent fee above which
no innovator would apply for the gold-plate tier be:

Pgp = P + G (1) − G (q1 ).
This is the fee at which type θ = 1 would be indifferent between applying for the
regular tier or for a gold-plate tier which has a perceived patent quality qgp = 1. For
any Pgp ≥ Pgp , the added-tier system results in the same equilibrium as the singletiered system with which we started. For Pgp < Pgp , some high θ innovators apply for
the gold-plate tier. To show that for some parameter values welfare in the two-tiered
system is higher than in the single-tiered system, we differentiate the welfare function
with respect to Pgp and evaluate the derivative at Pgp . Because W2 Pgp = W1, when
dW2
dPgp P
gp

( )

< 0 , welfare in the two-tiered system is higher for some Pgp < Pgp . Differenti-

ating W2 with respect to Pgp , we get:

dW2
dPgp
⎫
⎧
⎡CCS + 1 − θ * P − c π + θ * − θ P − c π + IS2 ⎤ dIS2
) ( gp ( )) (
( ))
2 (
∗)(
⎪
⎪
⎢
⎥ dPgp
2
⎣
⎦
1⎪
⎪
= ⎨
⎬.
I ⎪ ⎡ dCCS2 dθ *
⎛ dθ * dθ∗ ⎞
1 dIS2 ⎤
IS2 ⎪
+
−
−
[P − c (π )] +
(Pgp − c (π )) + (1 − θ *) + ⎜
⎪⎭
⎪⎩ ⎢⎣ dPgp
dPgp
2 dPgp ⎥⎦
⎝ dPgp dPgp ⎟⎠
We find

dIS2
dPgp

and

dCCS2
,
dPgp

and substitute these expressions in. Then, taking the limit

as Pgp Pgp , we have Pgp → [ P + G (1) − G (q1 )], θ * → 1, θ∗ → θ1, CCS2 → CCS1, IS2 →
IS1. Substituting and rearranging, we find:

dW2
dPgp

Pgp

dq1
dIS
dq
⎧
⎫
[CCS1 + (1 − θ1 )( P − c (π )) + IS1 ] ⎡⎢ 1 + (1 − θ1 )⎤⎥ r
⎪
⎪
dP
dP
dP
⎣
⎦
gp
1⎪
⎪
= ⎨
⎬ .
dθ∗ dθ *
I ⎪ ⎧⎛ dCCS1 dθ1 ⎞ dθ∗
⎫ ⎪
+⎨
− [ P − c (π )]
G
1
−
G
q
IS
−
(
)
(
)
[
1 ]⎬ 1
⎪⎩ ⎩⎝ dP
dP ⎠ dPgp
dPgp dPgp
⎭ ⎪⎭Pgp

Further manipulation of this expression and using the first order conditions for
optimality in the single-tiered system yields:
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dW2
dPgp

Pgp

(20)
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⎫
⎧
⎪
⎡ dIS1 + 1 − θ ⎤ ⎛ dθ * dθ1 ⎞ ⎪
θ
−
π
+
CCS
+
1
−
P
c
IS
(
)
(
(
)
)
(
)
[
]
1
1
1
1
⎪
⎢⎣ dP
⎥⎦ ⎜⎝ dPgp dP ⎟⎠ ⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪⎪
⎛ dθ∗ dθ1 ⎞
1 ⎪⎪
+ [CCS1 + (1 − θ1 ) ( P − c(π ))](1 − θ1 ) ⎜
= ⎨
⎬
⎟
I ⎪
⎝ dPgp dP ⎠
⎪

<0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
dθ *
−
⎪
⎪
[G (1) − G (q1 )] IS1
dPgp
⎪⎭Pgp
⎩⎪
⎧
⎫
dθ *
dIS1
IS1 dP
⎪
⎪⎪
+ (1 − θ1 )
gp ⎪
dP
<
+ G (q1 ) − G (1)⎬
⎨[CCS1 + (1 − θ1 ) ( P − c (π )) + IS1 ] dθ1
I  ⎪
IS1

⎪
dP




>0
⎪⎩
⎪⎭Pgp
:= K

Let K be defined as in (20). Note that K is finite and it only depends on the parameters
and solution of the given optimal single-tiered system. Therefore, if this condition
does not hold, we can find another benefit function that coincides with the original
benefit functions everywhere except for a range of qualities (1 − ε, 1) for some small
ε > 0 so as not to change the solution to the single-tiered system, yet have G(1) > K.
Thus, when the benefit function is large enough at high values of perceived patent
quality, a two-tiered system can improve welfare. Note that, in the derivations above,
we use comparative statics results from Proposition 2. These hold under the Jacobian
condition. We complete the proof by showing in Lemma 1 that for large enough G(1),
the Jacobian condition holds near Pgp .
■
Lemma 1. For θ uniformly distributed, in an added-tier system with Pr = P,
πr = πgp = π and Pgp → Pgp , the Jacobian condition holds when G(1) is sufficiently
large.
Proof.
(21)

By (16), the Jacobian condition holds if:

1−

(1 − π r qr )
[θ *G ′ (qr ) + (1 − θ *) (1 − π r )B ′ (qr )] qr
> 0.
[G (qgp ) − G (qr )] − [(1 − π gp ) B (qgp ) − (1 − π r ) B (qr )] (θ * + θ∗ )

In the added-tier system we use in Proposition 6, the system has πgp = πr = π, and
Pr = P. For values Pgp → [G(1) − G(q1) + P], we know θ*→1 and qgp → 1, θ* → θ1 and
qr→q1. Substituting these limits in (21), we find the sufficient condition:

1−

G ′ (q1 ) q1
(1 − π q1 )
> 0,
[G (1) − G (q1 )] − (1 − π )[B (1) − B (q1 )] (1 + θ1 )

which holds when:

G (1) − (1 − π ) B (1) > G ′ (q1 ) q1

(1 − π q1 )
+ G (q1 ) − (1 − π ) B (q1 ).
(1 + θ1 )
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Note that the right hand side only depends on the solution of the single-tiered system.
This latter condition holds when G(1) is sufficiently large. As argued in the proof of
Proposition 6, if the condition does not hold, we can choose another function G that
coincides with the original G(.) everywhere, except in a small enough range near 1,
where it increases to a high G(1).
■

APPENDIX B
THE LINEAR MODEL

We define here the linear model in which we assume a uniform distribution of types
and linear benefit functions.
Definition 6 (Linear Model). In the linear model, the distribution of inventors’ types
is uniform: F(θ) = θ, the benefit-functions are linear: G(q) = (G + G′q) and
B(q) = (B + B′q), satisfying our earlier assumptions (2) and (8).
We derive two independent sufficient conditions for the Jacobian condition to hold
in the linear model. The first is more likely to hold when πgp is large relative to πr, and
the second is stated for πgp = πr, and would be sufficient more generally when the πgp
is close to πr.
Lemma 2. In the linear model,
(i) If (Pgp − Pr) + (πgp − πr)(B + B′) − G′ > 0, then the Jacobian condition holds.
(ii) If π gp = π r ≤ 14 , and G′ > 2B′, then the Jacobian condition holds.
Proof.
(i) We substitute the linear functional forms in the sufficient condition (21) that
appears in Lemma 1. The Jacobian condition holds if:

1−

(1 − π r qr )
[θ *G ′ + (1 − θ *) (1 − π r ) B ′ ] qr
> 0.
G ′ (qgp − qr ) − [(1 − π gp ) ( B + B ′qgp ) − (1 − π r ) ( B + B ′qr )] (θ * + θ∗ )

We rearrange to get the condition as following:

(θ * + θ∗ ) −
1 − π r qr

[θ *G ′ + (1 − θ *) (1 − π r ) B ′ ] qr

[[G ′ − (1 − π r ) B ′ ](qgp − qr ) + (π gp − π r ) (B + B ′qgp )]

> 0.

Substituting θ* from the equilibrium condition h2(.) = 0 in (9), this inequality
holds if:

⎡ ( Pgp − Pr ) + (π gp − π r ) ( B + B ′qgp ) − G ′qgp + (qgp − θ *qr )[G ′ − (1 − π r ) B ′ ] ⎤
⎢
⎥ > 0.
[[G ′ − (1 − π r ) B ′ ](qgp − qr ) + (π gp − π r ) (B + B ′qgp )]
⎣
⎦
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Under our assumptions, the denominator of this expression is positive, and (by
the single crossing condition) so are the last two terms in the numerator. Hence a
sufficient condition for the Jacobian condition to hold is:

(Pgp − Pr ) + (π gp − π r ) (B + B ′ ) − G ′ > 0.
(ii) Substituting the linear functional forms and πgp = πr = π into (16) and omitting
only positive terms from that expression, we find that the Jacobian would be
positive if the following holds:

[θ *G ′ + (1 − θ *) (1 − π ) B ′ ] qgp (1 − π qgp )
[θ *G ′ + (1 − θ *) (1 − π ) B ′ ] qr (1 − π qr ) > 0.
+1−
[G ′ − (1 − π ) B ′ ][qgp − qr ] (1 + θ *)
[G ′ − (1 − π ) B ′ ][qgp − qr ] (θ * + θ∗ )
We substitute the following:

qr =

(θ * + θ∗ )
2 − 2π + π (θ * + θ∗ )

and qgp =

(1 + θ *)
2 − 2π + π (1 + θ *)

and rearrange this condition to obtain the sufficient condition:

⎞

⎛

⎜ π (θ * + θ ) ⎟ (q − q )
[G ′ − (1 − π ) B ′ ]
∗ ⎟ gp r + π (1 − π qr ) .
> π ⎜1 +
2 (1 − π )
2 (1 − π ) ⎟ (1 − θ∗ )
[θ *G ′ + (1 − θ *) (1 − π ) B ′ ] ⎜
⎜
⎝

≤

1
3

⎟
⎠

≤1

≤

2
3

Since we assumed π ≤ 14 , the expression on the right hand side is bounded by 12 ,
and the right hand side is larger than 12 when G′ > 2B′.
■
For the linear model, we can extend Proposition 2 with the following additional
comparative statics results.
Proposition 7. Under the Jacobian condition, in the linear model,
(i) As the regular patent fee (Pr) increases, the volume of gold-plate patents increases
and the quality of gold-plate patents decreases. Overall, there are fewer bad
patents.
(ii) As the examination intensity of gold-plate patents (πgp) increases, the overall
volume of patent applications increases, the volume of gold-plate patent applications decreases, the quality of gold-plate patents and the quality of regular
patents increase.
(iii) The overall volume of patent applications decreases with the examination intensity of regular patents (πr).
Proof. We continue to use the derivations from the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 7(i): Substituting the functional forms from the linear model described
in Definition 6, into expressions we derived in the proof of Proposition 2, we have
dN
dq
dθ *
< 0, dPgpr < 0 and dPr2 < 0 .
dPr
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Proposition 7(ii): Keeping everything else fixed in the linear model, differentiating
h1, h2, h3 and h4 with respect to πgp, we get:

∂h3
∂h1
= 0,
=
∂π gp ∂π gp
∂h2
= − (1 − θ *) ( B + B ′qgp ) < 0,
∂π gp
∂h4
(1 − θ *)2
=−
qgp < 0.
∂π gp
2
dθ

dq

gp
dq
Hence, dπ gp∗ < 0, ddπθgp* > 0, dπ gpr > 0 and dπ gp > 0 .
Proposition 7(iii): Keeping everything else fixed in the linear model, differentiating
h1, h2, h3 and h4 with respect to πr, we get:

∂h1
= − (1 − θ∗ ) ( B + B ′qr ) < 0,
∂π r
∂h2
= (1 − θ *) ( B + B ′qr ) > 0,
∂π r

(θ * − θ∗ ) q < 0,
∂h3
=−
r
∂π r
2
∂h4
= 0.
∂π r
2

Therefore,

dθ∗
dπ r

> 0.

■

We have considered changes in each policy control variable separately. If the
patent office has to cover costs and it couples an increase in examination intensity (πr)
with a corresponding increase in the patenting fee (Pr), from Propositions 2 and 7, we
conclude that such change would result in a decline in the volume of patent applications, but has an indeterminate effect on the proportion of innovators who are
granted bad patents. Similarly, an increase in both πgp and Pgp results in a higher
volume of patent applications, but has an indeterminate effect on the proportion of
innovators who are granted bad patents.
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